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Abstract
Top incomes in India have been rising sharply, relative to incomes in the rest of the
distribution. In this chapter, we show that this phenomenon has resulted in a delay in
female marriage. Our analysis takes advantage of variation in earnings distributions
across narrowly defined marriage markets. We examine a number of hypotheses, and
conclude that the pattern of results suggests a mechanism in which increases in top
male incomes prolong the duration of marital search on the part of women.
1 Introduction
The age at which women get married is important because it matters for fertility, and
the consequent trade-off between quality and quantity. In poor countries, where a large
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proportion of girls are married in their teens, early marriage has also been found to pre-
dict a number of adverse outcomes, including miscarriages, multiple unwanted pregnan-
cies, domestic violence, depression and even increased HIV risk (Bruce 2003, Clark 2004,
Nour 2006, Raj et al 2009, Santhya et al 2010). It is encouraging, therefore, that the last few
decades have witnessed a secular upward trend in the age at marriage across developing
countries (Jensen and Thornton 2003). This phenomenon is usually attributed to factors
such as improved work opportunities and the returns to education for women, and better
enforcement of legal age minimums.
A different set of explanations relate to the structural features of the marriage market
itself. Interestingly, although the standard model of marriage formation propounded by
Becker (1974) is silent about when women get married, later extensions that incorporate
the realistic frictions involved in meeting potential partners (Burdett and Cole 1995, Smith
1995) have a natural implication in terms of the average search duration that women
will experience before agreeing to a match, and therefore the average age at marriage.
In this search/match theoretic framework, search duration depends on the frequency of
meetings (which depends on the intensity of search as well as on the relative numbers of
men and women), and the distribution of marriage-market relevant characteristics among
potential partners. The first of these factors has received considerable attention in the
empirical literature (e.g. Schoen 1983, Lichter et al 1992, Angrist 2002, Attane 2006, Rios-
Rull et al 2013) and is referred to as the marriage squeeze hypothesis. However, the
second has received relatively little attention.
In this chapter, we examine how the income distribution of marriageable males affects
female marital search duration and the age at marriage in India. We focus on income
distribution for three reasons. First, income is arguably the most important non-caste
male attribute of relevance in the marriage market; second, the income distribution has
been changing rapidly in India in the last few decades - while average incomes have
increased, these gains have been disproportionately been captured by the highest earners
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(Banerjee and Piketty 2005) - and the effects of these changes on marriage decisions are as
yet unknown; third, because rates of female labor force participation were quite low over
the study period, changes in the income distribution largely work through one side of the
marriage market, which makes it easier to predict their effects as well as to disentangle
them empirically from factors that may affect women directly.
In a simple model of marital search, an increase in the income of the average male has
an ambiguous effect on search duration (and hence female age at marriage), whereas an
increase in income inequality of the kind that India has experienced should be expected
to increase search duration - this is therefore a surprising beneficial effect of increasing
income inequality. The basic intuition behind this hypothesis is that an increase in top
incomes among men encourages the average woman to wait for offers from high-earning
candidates, thereby increasing her expected search duration. Loughran (2002) finds em-
pirical support for this hypothesis in the context of the United States, estimating that
increases in male wage inequality may have accounted for 7-18% percent of the decline
in marriage rates for women between 1970 and 1990, an effect at least as large as that of
factors such as increasing female labor force participation and access to birth control. In
contexts in which dowry (or groom-price) is practiced (as in India), however, an impor-
tant countervailing force applies, because the income increase at the top of the distribution
gets priced in the form of dowry, i.e. men whose incomes have increased will demand
more dowry, which dampens the effect of their increased income. Whether increasing in-
come inequality has a meaningful impact on age at marriage in such a setting is therefore
an empirical question.
We examine this question by utilizing a rich source of household data that has un-
usually comprehensive information on individual income that includes income from self-
employment and imputed income from participation in household farm and non-farm
businesses: This is particularly important for our purpose because a significant propor-
tion of income (especially in rural settings) is derived from non-wage sources. The analy-
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sis faces two related empirical challenges. First, it is difficult to isolate quasi-experimental
variation in the income distribution, in order to obtain its causal effect on outcomes of in-
terest. Second, it is difficult to determine the underlying mechanism by which changes
in the income distribution affect outcomes. We attempt to address these challenges as
follows: We utilize the fact that marriage markets in India are segmented by caste and
geography, which implies that we can examine the effect of income distribution within a
particular marriage market while controlling for confounding factors that apply at levels
broader than the marriage market by means of state and caste fixed effects. Because mar-
riage markets are quite narrowly defined, this strategy credibly isolates effects that arise
via the marriage market. A more stringent test of the mechanism is possible, because
conditional on the male income distribution in a particular marriage market, marital out-
comes in that market should not be affected by changes in the male income distribution
in other marriage markets. This indeed turns out to be the case, and provides a strong
confirmation that we are picking up effects that work via the marriage market, rather than
through other markets (e.g. the labor market).
Overall, the results indicate that rising male income inequality has a causal effect on
the female age at marriage. The effects of changes in the male income distribution are
however nuanced: Specifically, female marriage rates (and the age at marriage) decline
in response to increases in top male incomes, but are unresponsive to changes in the rest
of the male income distribution. We also find marked effects on women’s educational
attainment (in terms of years of schooling, as well as high school and college comple-
tion rates). The results are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls including
measures of female income distribution, observable female characteristics and marriage-
market relevant factors such as the sex ratio. We also find that the effects are not stronger
for uneducated women, indicating that the increased age at marriage is not a consequence
of a decision to seek more education.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple marital search framework
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which provides intuition for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used in
the main analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and the results, and Section
5 concludes.
2 A model of marriage market search
We sketch the outline of a model of marital search that suggests some predictions that
can be tested in the data. The basic intuition can be summarized as follows: An increase
in income at the top of the distribution makes high-earning men relatively more attrac-
tive candidates than before, and makes women reluctant to accept proposals from lower-
earning candidates. Because proposals do not all arrive at once, this tends to increase the
duration of time that a woman remains unmarried. The search-theoretic approach, which
has been frequently used to model the process of match formation in marriage markets
(e.g. Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977; Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1984; Bergstrom and
Bagnoli, 1993), offers a natural way to formalize this hypothesis.
The setup of the model is analogous to that of a model of labor search: An infinitely-
lived, risk-neutral woman sequentially samples marriage offers from a known distribu-
tion of offers, before finally accepting an offer (Maertens (2013) finds that women in rural
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra sample an average of five prospective candidates). As
in Loughran (2002), we assume that women prefer high-earning males over low-earnings
males and that this is the only dimension of groom heterogeneity, so that the male earn-
ings distribution characterizes the distribution of offers.
We assume that the woman receives exactly one offer in each period and that this offer
is an independent and random draw from the male earnings distribution. The earnings
associated with this offer is denoted by x. The woman may either accept or reject this
proposal. If she chooses to reject it, she will have to wait one more period, during which
she will receive a utility of c, which is the per-period utility from remaining single (and
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which may be negative for some women).
The form of the solution to this optimization problem is known to be the following:
There is a reservation earnings level, denoted by R, above which the woman will accept
any offer, and below which she will reject any offer. Associated with R, one can define
the per-period probability of “escape” from the marriage market, i.e., the probability of
getting married, q:
q = P(x > R) (1)
Lower values of q imply greater search duration (in expectation), or equivalently,
higher age at marriage. The expected number of periods of search before an offer is ac-
cepted can be shown to be 1/q.1
It can be shown in this model that a mean-preserving spread in the male earning dis-
tribution unambiguously increases the reservation level R. The effect on search duration
is ambiguous, but it is likely that for most values of R, the net effect on search duration
is positive (Burdett and Ondrich 1985). We refer the interested reader to the proofs in
Mortensen (1986) and Loughran (2002).
We are unlikely, however, to observe mean-preserving spreads in the data. The avail-
able evidence indicates that for a number of English-speaking countries as well as India
and China, recent increases in income inequality are largely being driven by increases in
income for people in the upper tails of the income distribution (Atkinson, Piketty and
Saez 2011). Banerjee and Piketty (2005) use income tax data to show that incomes of the
top 1% in India increased by 50% in the 1990s, and that their share of total income nearly
doubled. In the empirical analysis, we will accordingly separate out the impact of in-
creases in upper-tail incomes (relative to median incomes) from the impact of reductions
in lower-tail incomes.
While analytical proofs are difficult, it is possible to intuitively predict the direction of
1Formally, the time to marriage follows a geometric distribution, and the average waiting time of such a
process is the reciprocal of the per-period probability of success.
6
impact in these cases. Consider an increase in income at the 90th percentile (say), relative
to the median income. For women with reservation levels below the 90th percentile (this
includes the majority of women), this would increase the value of rejecting an offer equal
to R. This would result in an increase in R and (most likely) an increase in search duration.
However, a reduction in income at the 10th percentile (say) relative to median incomes,
would have no effect on reservation levels and search durations for women whose ini-
tial reservation levels were above the 10th percentile (this likely includes the majority of
women). These asymmetric predictions can be tested in the data.
A complication that is not addressed in the one-sided search model is that the set of
candidates that would potentially be willing to make offers to a given woman is deter-
mined in equilibrium, and will depend on the search strategies of both men and women.
In general, the impact of an increase in male income inequality may not be the same for
all women, because the pool of candidates that a woman would potentially receive of-
fers from would depend on her own characteristics relative to other women. Because the
data do not contain any information on the pre-marital characteristics of women (espe-
cially the socio-economic circumstances of their natal households), we are unable to test
for such heterogeneous effects. We have therefore chosen to model the search process on
the part of a woman, while abstracting from the search behavior on the part of men, but
it should be understood that the empirical relationship between income inequality and
female age at marriage captures the average effect on all women in equilibrium.
Second, we consider how these conclusions are affected once we allow for dowry
transfers. The institution of dowry (an in-kind/cash transfer from the bride’s household
to the groom’s household at the time of marriage) is still remarkably prevalent in India.
Dowry is commonly thought of as representing a compensating transfer that is increasing
in the productive characteristics of the groom (e.g. Rao 1993). In a marriage market
where dowry transfers are allowed, it is plausible that an increase in their incomes should
increase the dowry payments demanded by high-earning men - this would partially offset
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the increase in their desirability as grooms. As a result, an increase in upper-tail incomes
can be expected have a smaller impact on marital search durations in a marriage market
with dowry transfers.
A second institutional feature not captured in the model is that women in India expe-
rience a significant amount of social pressure to get married early, and being unmarried
invites social stigma. Caldwell et al (1983) note that ". . . a major control over the age at
marriage of women is provided by the fact that many families feel deep disquiet and guilt
over the presence of an unmarried menstruating daughter in the household. . . " In terms
of the model, this could be accommodated by allowing the utility from remaining single,
c, to decline (or become more negative) with search duration. It is intuitive that in this
environment, the impact of an increase in income inequality on search duration will be
smaller than in an environment in which c is (relatively) fixed.
3 Data
The analysis makes use of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), conducted
in 2005. The IHDS is a nationally representative survey of 41,554 rural and urban Indian
households in all twenty-eight states and five union territories.2 The IHDS administered
household, school, village, and medical facility surveys, collecting poverty, health, em-
ployment, economic, and social data.
Defining the analysis sample: The analysis uses two overlapping samples of women.
The first sample is derived from the household roster, which provides the age and marital
status of each household member. The outcome of interest for this sample is their current
marital status. We restrict attention to women of "marriageable" age, defined to be those
between the ages of 14 and 30 (nearly all women in India are married by the age of 30).
We will refer to this as the “full sample”, which consists of 27,454 women. The second
2Lakshwadeep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were excluded.
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sample consists of ever-married women (one such woman was randomly chosen from
each surveyed household), who were administered a detailed questionnaire. The ever-
married women were interviewed about their marriage and birth histories, health beliefs
and educational attainment. The main outcome of interest for this sample is their reported
age at marriage. Once again, we restrict attention to those between the ages of 14 and
30. In addition, to address the issue that some of the women may have married many
years ago (when the extent of income inequality in the marriage market was perhaps
very different), we further restrict the sample to only include women who were married
in the last two years. We refer to this sample as the “ever-married sample”, which consists
of 703 women.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the two samples of women. It is notewor-
thy that only a tiny fraction (4%) of ever-married women are currently attending school,
consistent with the observation that women typically drop out of school once they are
married (if they have not already dropped out earlier). In the ever-married sample, the
average age at marriage is 20.12 and the average educational attainment is 7.84 years. As
a point of comparison, the average age and educational attainment of women who got
married in 1987 were 17.23 and 3.70 respectively.3
Defining the marriage market: As reported by Banerjee et al (2010) caste preference is ex-
tremely strong in Indian marriage markets, even in urban settings. About 95% of women
in our ever-married sample reported marrying within their caste group. The households
in our sample are categorized into five caste groups: Brahmins (6.86%), Other high caste
(20.16%), Scheduled Castes (SC) (23.66%), Scheduled Tribes (ST) (7.44%) and Other Back-
ward Classes (OBC) (41.88%).4
3These were calculated by looking at ever-married women in the data who got married in 1987.
4SC, ST and OBC are official categories that are linked to various governmental quotas and reservations.
The categorization we are using represents an admittedly high level of grouping: In actual fact, marriage
markets are much more narrowly defined, with literally thousands of endogamous groups (known as
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Due to ethnic and linguistic differences between the states of India, the boundaries of
a state form a second natural boundary for the marriage market. Partly as a result, the
marital household is typically situated in close proximity to the woman’s natal household:
Nearly 90% of the women in the ever-married sample report that they live within 5 hours
traveling distance of their families.
We now define the marriage market of a woman of “marriageable age” to include all
unmarried men between the ages 18 of 35, who belong to the same caste and state as
the woman, and who are not currently enrolled in school. This gives rise to a set of 152
distinct marriage markets.
Constructing the distribution of earnings: The IHDS elicited detailed information on the
employment, occupation, and earnings of individuals in the household, including the
annual earnings of individuals from employment outside the home, the net income the
household received from farm and business activities, and the contribution of each indi-
vidual (in terms of days worked) to that farm or business. We use these data to construct
a comprehensive measure of annual individual earnings, which accounts for earnings
from paid employment for work done outside the home and the individual’s share of
net income from household farm and business ventures. To obtain this share, we assign
household farm and business income to each household member in proportion to the
number of days the individual spent on that activity during the year (relative to the total
number of days household members devoted to the activity).
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the earnings distribution for each caste group.
The caste system is associated with an economic hierarchy (with Brahmins at the top), as
can be seen from comparing the mean earnings of different castes (in fact, the earnings
distributions for higher castes appear to first-order stochastically dominate the earnings
jatis). Although the survey records a finer level of grouping than the one we use, sample size quickly
becomes an issue in terms of being able to estimate earnings distributions for each marriage market.
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distributions for lower castes). The sample is evenly distributed between castes, with
each caste associated with approximately 30 marriage markets in the data. There are 152
marriage markets in total, distributed across 33 states (an average of 5.5 marriage markets
per state).
4 Analysis
4.1 Effect of income inequality on marriage rates
We begin by estimating the effect of income inequality on marriage rates. The base-
line specification utilizes variation in income distributions (and hence income inequal-
ity) along caste and geographic dimensions, while controlling for unobserved caste- and
region-specific factors (such as marital norms) by the inclusion of caste and state fixed
effects. The following linear probability regression specification is used:
yiacs = α+ β1(e
90
cs   e50cs ) + β2(e50cs   e10cs ) + β3e50cs + ηa + ηc + ηs + uiacs (2)
where yiacs is a dummy for whether woman i of age a belonging to caste c and residing
in state s is married; e10cs , e50cs and e90cs denote the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles respectively
of the male income distribution in caste c in state s; ηa, ηc and ηs are age, caste and state
fixed effects respectively, and uics is an error term. As before, the coefficients of interest
are β1 and β2, which capture the effect of increases in upper-tail and lower-tail inequality,
respectively. The regression sample includes all women of marriageable age, i.e. those
between the ages of 14 and 30. The standard errors are corrected by clustering at the
marriage market level.
[Table 3 here]
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from the baseline specification. In Column
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2, we examine whether the results are robust to controlling for an urban/rural indicator
and the sex ratio (the ratio of marriageable males to females in the market); the latter is an
important predictor of marriage rates that may be affected by changes in the income dis-
tribution. We find that income inequality has a robust effect on marriage rates. A 10,000
rupee increase in upper-tail earnings inequality (representing a roughly 24% increase over
the average level of upper tail inequality) lowers the probability of getting married (on
average) by 0.8-1.1 percentage points. Increases in lower tail inequality have smaller and
statistically insignificant effects on the marriage propensity. It should be noted that the co-
efficients on the lower tail measures are also economically insignificant because lower tail
inequality is much smaller on average than upper tail inequality: A 10,000 rupee increase
amounts to 74% and 322% increases, respectively, in (e50cs   e10cs ) and (e30cs   e10cs )). Overall,
the results in Columns 1 and 2 are consistent with the predictions of the model of marital
search outlined in Section 2. In Column 3, we include controls for male earnings distri-
bution in other marriage markets (i.e. not the one the woman is located in): Specifically
we control for the earnings distribution measures averaged over all other caste groups in
the woman’s state, as well as the earnings distribution measures averaged over marriage
markets in the same caste group as the woman but located in other states. We find that the
effect of earnings inequality in the woman’s own marriage market remains robust to the
inclusion of these measures; interestingly, her decision does not appear to be affected by
male earnings distributions in other marriage markets. This result provides a strong con-
firmation that the mechanism underlying the observed effect runs through the marriage
market.
As a further check on the causal interpretation of the results, we test whether there
are any systematic differences between women situated in high- and low-inequality mar-
riage markets. For the test to be meaningful, we need to compare characteristics that are
pre-determined with respect to the marriage market, i.e. they cannot themselves be out-
comes of the marriage market decision. Natal household characteristics (e.g. mother’s
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and father’s education) are potentially suitable for this test, but the practice of patrilocal-
ity (whereby the bride moves into the groom’s household after marriage) implies that we
do not observe married women in their natal households. We have available, however,
two observable characteristics of women that are arguably pre-determined in the sense
described above: Height and age at menarche. These characteristics also have the benefit
of being important predictors of the age at marriage: Height matters directly on the mar-
riage market, in addition to being a good proxy for socio-economic status; and menarche
usually triggers marital search. We utilize the same regression specification as before,
but restrict the sample to ever-married women (because height and age at menarche are
only observed for this sample). Table 4 presents the results. We find that neither of these
pre-determined characteristics has a statistically significant correlation with the measures
of income inequality, which further strengthens the causal interpretation of the results in
Table 3.
The previous analysis established that an increase in male income inequality reduces
marriage rates for women. To estimate the average implied increase in the age at mar-
riage, we again turn to the ever-married sample for whom we have information on age at
marriage. The regression specification is as follows:
Ageatmarriageics = α+ β1(e
90
cs   e50cs ) + β2(e50cs   e10cs ) + β3e50cs + ηc + ηs + uiacs (3)
where Ageatmarriageics denotes the age at marriage of woman i belonging to caste c
and residing in state s. Because this is a sample of married women, sample selection is an
issue: In particular, younger women may be over-represented in low-inequality markets
(relative to high inequality markets). This implies that the woman’s current age is a "bad
control", in the terminology of Angrist and Pischke (2008). Accordingly the specification
above does not include controls for the woman’s age.
[Table 5 here]
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Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results. A 10,000 rupee increase in upper tail inequality
implies an increase in average age at marriage of 0.18 years. A second way to estimate
the extent of delay in marriage, which does not entail the sample selection issue discussed
above, is to estimate a duration model that uses the information on the (right-censored)
survival times of unmarried women. To do so, we model survival time (i.e. time-to-
marriage) as follows:
ln(Tics) = α+ β1(e
90
cs   e50cs ) + β2(e50cs   e10cs ) + β3e50cs + ηc + ηs + uics (4)
where Tics is the (latent) survival time of woman i belonging to caste c and residing in
state s. The error uics is assumed to be distributed according to an extreme value distri-
bution.5 The model is estimated by maximum likelihood in order to take into account
the censored observations for which marriage has not yet occurred. In this specification,
the β coefficients measure the proportionate effect on survival time of unit changes in the
earnings measures.
The results are reported in Column 2 of Table 5, and indicate that a 10,000 rupee change
in upper tail inequality would increase survival time by 1.6 percent. Because the average
age at marriage in our sample is 20.12, this implies a delay in marriage of 0.32 years, a
larger effect than obtained using the regression in Eqn (3).
We have interpreted our results through the lens of a marital search model. An alter-
native hypothesis is that an increase in top male incomes may simply be correlated with
(i.e. acting as a proxy for) an increase in the returns to education, which may cause some
women to stay in school longer and thereby postpone their marriage. This hypothesis
can be directly tested by controlling for the returns to education, in the form of average
earnings of women who have completed different levels of education. We will do so by
including the (marriage-market specific) average female earnings for four levels of ed-
5Under this assumption, time to marriage, T, has the Weibull distribution, and the model may equivalently
be thought of as a Proportional Hazards (PH) model or as an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model.
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ucational attainment: (i) Fewer than 6 years of education, (ii) Between 6 and 10 years
of education, (iii) Between 10 and 12 years of education, and (iv) More than 12 years of
education. An indirect set of tests is also possible: Differently from the marital search
hypothesis, the returns to schooling hypothesis implies that an increase in male income
inequality should not delay marriage for (i) Women who are no longer attending school,
and (ii) Women who never attended school, and thus have zero years of education (this is
a sizeable proportion of the sample of women). We can test these implications in the data.
A benefit to implementing these indirect tests is that they also allow us to check whether
the results are simply due to the male income variables being correlated with unobserved
tastes for education among women.
[Table 6 here]
We implements these three tests in Table 6. In Column 1, we estimate the baseline
regression model, but this time we control for the average female earnings variables de-
scribed above. The coefficients on the male income variables remain virtually unchanged,
however, when we do so, indicating that the latter are not very strongly correlated with fe-
male earnings. This is not particularly surprising, because women in India have generally
participated in very different income-generating activities than men. In Columns 2 and
3, we re-estimate the baseline regression model splitting the sample into those who are
still attending school (Column 2) and those who are not (Column 3). Both sets of women
delay marriage in response to greater upper-tail inequality, indicating that women are not
postponing marriage in order to obtain more education. In Columns 4 and 5, we split the
sample into those who have zero years of education and those who have at least one year
of education. The two sets of women respond almost identically to increases in upper-tail
inequality. Together, these tests confirm that the estimated effects of top male incomes on
female marriage are not simply picking up the effect of higher returns to female education
or unobserved tastes for education.
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4.2 Effect of income inequality on female education
We have seen that the observed effect of income inequality on marriage rates does
not obtain via an increased demand for education. Nonetheless, income inequality may
affect educational attainment via the former’s effect on marriage. Because schooling is
typically discontinued after marriage (96% of the ever-married women in our sample
are no longer in school), an important implication of increasing income inequality is that
by delaying marriage, it may result in women staying in school longer and obtaining
more education. To test this hypothesis, we begin by examining the effect of income
inequality on the probability of current school attendance for the full sample. The results,
reported in Column 1 of Table 7, are consistent with the estimates obtained for marriage
propensities: A unit increase in upper tail inequality increases the probability that the
woman is currently attending school by 0.9 percentage points.
[Table 7 here]
Next, we turn to the ever-married sample, restricting attention to those who are no
longer in school, and examine the effect of income inequality on their completed years
of schooling. The results, reported in Column 2 of Table 7, indicate that a 10,000 rupee
increase in upper tail inequality increases years of schooling by 0.44 years. To account
for the sample selection inherent in the ever-married sample, in Column 3, we estimate
a duration model as in Section 5.2, where the dependent variable is completed years of
schooling. The duration model estimates indicate that a 10,000 rupee increase in upper-
tail inequality should increase completed years of schooling by 2.4% - this amounts to
approximately 0.18 extra years of schooling, a smaller estimate than that obtained in Col-
umn 2.
We can refine the analysis further by observing that the marital search hypothesis im-
plies that higher inequality should increase educational attainment only to the extent that
prolonged search extends the woman’s attendance in school. Because women would nor-
16
mally be in secondary school by the time they reach marriageable age, we would expect
that an increase in income inequality would only affect rates of completion of secondary
schooling (and above), but should not have an effect on the rate of completion of lower
levels of schooling. In Table 8, we look separately at the effects of income inequality on
the probabilities of completing at least one year of education, six years of education (cor-
responding to at least primary school completion), 10 years of education (at least lower
secondary completion), 12 years of education (at least high school completion), and 15
years of education (college completion) respectively. The results are strongly supportive
of the predictions of the marital search hypothesis: Whereas there is little evidence of an
effect on the rates of completion of lower levels of education, rates of completion of high
school and college increase significantly by 5.2 and 4.4 percentage points respectively.
[Table 8 here]
5 Concluding discussion
We use nationally representative data from India to test the hypothesis that increas-
ing income inequality causes women to delay their marriage. In line with the predictions
from a marital search model, we find that increases in upper tail inequality delay mar-
riage, while increases in lower tail inequality have no significant effect. We examine a
number of alternative hypotheses and conclude that the overall pattern of results strongly
points towards the marital search mechanism. In particular, the results do not seem to be
driven by an increased demand for higher education.
These results have an immediate welfare significance because the female age at mar-
riage is thought to affect a host of economic and health outcomes. For example, early mar-
riage has been associated with low contraceptive use, miscarriages, multiple unwanted
pregnancies, domestic violence, depression, and even increased HIV risk (Bruce, 2003;
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Clark, 2004; Nour, 2006; Raj et al., 2009; Santhya et al., 2010). Although the exact mech-
anisms by which age at marriage affects later outcomes have not been definitively es-
tablished in the literature, we focus on educational attainment, which is thought to be
an important intermediate outcome, and show that women in high-inequality markets
obtain more education. Consistent with the search hypothesis, higher income inequality
increases high school and college completion rates by about 5.2 and 4.4 percentage points,
but has no effect on rates of completion of lower levels of schooling.
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